)>IJH=?J. In the classical model of cooperative games, it is considered that each coalition of players can form and cooperate to obtain its worth.
Introduction
A cooperative game is a pair (N; v) of a nite set N of players and a characteristic function v : 2 N ! R; such that v (;) = 0. A subset S of N is called a coalition. This paper is concerned with cooperative games in which the cooperation among players is partial. We will consider that there are two rules of cooperation between players:
² If a coalition may form, then every subset is also feasible, since if the players that take part in the formation of a coalition have common interests, then every subset of these players has at least the same common interests.
² Given two feasible coalitions with di¤erent number of players, there is a player of the largest that he can join with the smallest making a feasible coalition.
For this reason, we will dene the feasible coalitions by using combinatorial geometries called matroids. The set systems called matroids were introduced by Whitney (1935) as an abstraction of linear independence and the cyclic structure of graphs. The origin of the actual matroid theory is the work of Tutte (1959) and it has numerous applications in combinatorics and optimization theory. We refer the reader to Welsh (1976) and Korte, Lovász and Schrader (1991) for a detailed treatment of matroids.
Let us outline the contents. Section 2 treats the essential notions on matroids, such as its properties, its rank function and its basic coalitions (being maximal feasible coalitions with respect to inclusion of sets). For the sake of the game theoretic approach, the rank function of a matroid is interpreted as a classical cooperative game and next, the game theoretic solution concept called core is dened as the set of optimal solutions of a certain linear programming problem in which the rank function of the matroid is involved. Edmonds (1970) showed that the core coincides with the convex hull of the incidence vectors corresponding to basic coalitions of the matroid.
Section 3 introduces the concept of a cooperative game on a matroid as a real-valued function on the matroid itself. In other words, the characteristic function of this type of a cooperative game is dened only for feasible coalitions arising from the matroid. Similar, but di¤erent versions already do exist, see Faigle (1989) and Nagamochi, Zeng, Kabutoya and Ibaraki (1997) . The main part of Section 3 deals with the axiomatic development of the solution theory for games on matroids. As a matter of fact, we are concerned with the linearity axiom (in the variable being the characteristic function of the game), the monotonicity axiom (solutions should allocate nonnegative payo¤s to players whenever the utility of coalitions increases in accordance with the inclusion of coalitions), as well as the dummy player axiom (nonimportant players receive their natural solutions). The solutions that satisfy these three axioms are characterized as the so-called quasi-probabilistic values. Such a solution for any individual player may be interpreted as some expected outcome based on the players marginal contributions for joining the feasible coalitions of the induced contraction matroid. Another equivalence theorem (with no reference to axioms anymore; see Theorem 3.2) states that an individual solution is a quasi-probabilistic value if and only if the solution is decomposable as the weighted sum of certain solutions for induced subgames dened on power sets associated with the basic coalitions of the matroid. The relevant weights are interpreted as a probabilty distribution over the set of basic coalitions of the matroid.
Section 4 introduces the solution concept called Shapley value for games on matroids, meant to be a generalization of the known Shapley value for classical cooperative games. The axiomatic approach taken here involves, besides the linearity and substitution axioms, a probabilistic version of the e¢ciency and dummy player property. In this framework, it is supposed that basic coalitions are formed randomly according to a xed probability distribution over the set of basic coalitions of the matroid. As a result of this axiomatic approach, two explicit formulas for the probabilistic Shapley value of games on matroids are presented and discussed. (1) Notice that S 2 Mif and only if r(S) = jSj. The following two theorems (see Korte et al. (1991) ) axiomatize matroids in terms of their rank functions. otherwise. The following theorem has been showed by Edmonds (1970) and provides one interpretation of the core of a cooperative game induced by the rank function of a matroid. Then the contraction of a feasible coalition S is a matroid formed with the feasible coalitions of the initial matroid that do not include any members of S, whereas its union with S is still a feasible coalition in the initial matroid. Example 2.3. Given a graph G = (V; E), where V is the vertex set and E is the edge set, the graphic matroid M (G) consists of all subsets of E that contain no cycle of G: Maximal forests of G are the basic coalitions of M (G) and its rank function is given by r (X) = jV (X)j ¡ k (X) for all X µ E, where V (X) is the vertex set of the spanning forest of X and k (X) its number of connected components. 3. An axiomatic approach to quasi-probabilistic values A cooperative game on the matroid M is dened to be a real-valued function v : M ! R satisfying v(;) = 0. In words, a cooperative game on a matroid represents an evaluation of the potential utility of any feasible coalition, whereas non-feasible coalitions are totally ignored because such coalitions are supposed not to be formed anyhow. For instance, in the context of the uniform matroid U n k , the n participants in a trip are only interested in measuring the utility of any group consisting of at most k persons because of the limited number of seats in various identical minibuses to be used for transportation during the trip. 
Proof. The implication (ii) ) (i) is obvious. To prove the converse implication, we rst dene, for every nonempty T 2 M, the unanimity game u T : M ! R and the identity game ± T : M ! R as follows: Note that u T = P fS 2M:S ¶T g ± S for all nonempty T 2 M. Suppose Ã i satises the linearity, monotonicity, and¸i-dummy player properties. Let
We claim 
where v B is the restriction of the game v to 2 B :
Proof. where the interrelationship between the coe¢cients is determined as follows:
for all T 2M=i. The equality (7) By construction, the equation (7) 
where Ã however, are not necessarily disjoint and so, two basic coalitions with at least one mutual member can not be formed at the same time. This section is devoted to a model based on a probabilistic approach to the formation of basic coalitions. In other words, this static model involves probability distributions over the various cooperation areas (basic coalitions) and according to this random process, each feasible coalition interacts within its relevant cooperation areas with certain probabilities. Since it is supposed that a basic coalition forms randomly, we will deal with an arbitrary probability distribution over the set of basic coalitions denoted by P (M) = probabilistic participation inuence vector (with respect to P ), the components of which are the probabilistic participation inuences of individuals within the cooperation areas of the matroid. The next result asserts that the set consisting of all probabilistic participation inuence vectors coincides with the core of the rank game (induced by the rank function of the matroid M). In other words, every core-allocation of the rank game represents in a natural and unique manner the (probabilistic) rate of participation by individuals within the cooperation areas of the matroid. Obviously, the probabilistic rate of participation by any istmus player (who belongs to every basic coalition) equals one. The axiomatic approach to the extended Shapley value involves four axioms, of which the linearity is formulated in a classical manner, the substitution axiom is applied to some substitutes in unanimity games, whereas the dummy player and e¢ciency axioms are formulated with reference to a given probability distribution over the cooperation areas of the considered matroid. Proof. In order to prove the uniqueness part, suppose a group value Ã satises the linearity, substitution applied to unanimity games, probabilistic e¢ciency, and P -dummy player properties. Consider, for every T 2 M, T 6 = ;, the unanimity game u T : M ! R as dened at the beginning of the proof of Theorem 3.1. Recall that every i = 2 T is a dummy player in the game u T and thus, by the P -dummy player property for 
Because the set fu T : T 2 M; T 6 = ;g of unanimity games forms a basis of ¡(M) and Ã is supposed to be linear, we conclude that the group value Ã is uniquely determined on ¡(M) by the four axioms involved. In order to prove the existence part, we rst show that formula (10) agrees with the alternative formula (11). Recall that, for every B 2 B(M), With the aid of (11) and the classical e¢ciency of the classical Shapley value on free matroids, we are able to establish the probabilistic e¢ciency property for the probabilistic Shapley value Sh P as follows: Since the classical Shapley value on free matroids satises the classical dummy player property, we arrive at the P -dummy player property for the probabilistic Shapley value Sh P i as follows:
An alternative proof of the P -dummy player property for the probabilistic Shapley value Sh P i proceeds as follows. From (10), we derive that, for every dummy player i in a game v 2 ¡(M), the following holds: 
Indeed, in view of (9), the proof of (13) This completes the alternative proof of the P -dummy player property for the probabilistic Shapley value Sh P i as given by (10).
Remark 4.1. By (10), the probabilistic Shapley value for games on an arbitrary matroid represents some kind of an expected value, in that the expected payo¤ to every player is composed of the players marginal contributions in the game with respect to feasible coalitions contained in the contraction of the matroid to the player. We take into account the probabilistic participation inuences of these feasible coalitions enlarged with the player as well as a (classical) probability distribution arising from the belief that the feasible coalition, to which the player joins, is equally likely with probability r(N ) ¡1 to be of any cardinality t, 0 · t · r(N ) ¡ 1, and that all such coalitions of the same cardinality t are equally likely with probability Remark 4.2. By the decomposition formula (11), the probabilistic Shapley value for games on a matroid is fully determined by classical Shapley values on free matroids induced by the basic coalitions of the given matroid, taking into account the probabilities of these basic coalitions. The impact of the decomposition formula (11) was already illustrated in the proof of Theorem 4.2 in that known properties (like e¢ciency and dummy player property) for the classical Shapley value are basic tools to prove similar properties for the extension of the Shapley value to games on an arbitrary matroid. For the ongoing research on the Shapley value for games on matroids, this decomposition formula (11) may be an extremely helpful tool to get knowledge of particular properties.
Remark 4.3. The probabilistic Shapley value for games on matroids as given by (10) does not satisfy the classical substitution property. For instance, consider again the matroid M 3 (1k2) (see Remark 3.1). Given the game v (f1g) = v (f3g) = v (f2g) = 1; v (f1; 3g) = v (f2; 3g) = 2; the players 1 and 3 are substitutes in the classical sense since v(S nf1g) = v(S nf3g) for all S 2 M 3 (1k2) with f1;3g µ S. By choosing the probabilities P (f1; 3g) = P (f2; 3g) = 1 2 , formula (10) yields Sh P 1 (v) = 1 2 , whereas Sh P 3 (v) = 1, although the players 1 and 3 are substitutes in the classical sense.
